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A CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF REDD+ LEGAL ARCHITECTURE IN
REDUCING EMISSIONS FROM FORESTRY SECTORS IN
INDONESIAN
I Gusti Agung Made Wardana
Abstract
A new scheme called “Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Forest
Degradation in Developing Countries plus Conservation, Sustainable
Management of Forests, and Enhancement of Forest Carbon Stocks” (REDD+)
is being discussed to be one of the essential elements of the post-2012
global climate change regime. Many countries have put their proposal on the
architectures of such scheme to the UNFCCC and demonstrated pilot projects
on the ground as well. The research has been conducted to analyze critically the
extent to which the REDD+ architecture being designed in Indonesia would be
able to deliver climate effectiveness, costs efficient, equity outcomes and social
and environmental co-benefits (3E+). It is argued that the basic idea of REDD+
is very simple to incentivize emission-reduction activities from forestry sectors
in developing countries. However, so far, the REDD+ architecture appears to
contain several contentious issues. Therefore, the issues should be addressed
seriously otherwise they would undermine the REDD+ objectives.

Key words: climate change, environmental law, forestry, Indonesia, Post2012 Regime, REDD+, UNFCCC.
I.

Introduction

The Kyoto Protocol’s first commitment period ends in 2012. Recently,
the state parties to the UNFCCC and its Kyoto Protocol have negotiated to
formulate the next international regime to regulate anthropogenic causes of
climate change. They expected that the regime would be adopted in the 17th
Conference of Parties (COP 17) in Durban, South Africa last year. However, due
to challenging issues, delegates failed to reach an agreement. One of the biggest
challenges was whether parties would continue the Kyoto Protocol as the only
legally binding instrument under the UNFCCC. On the one hand, majority of
developing countries have put a stance to have a second commitment period of
the Kyoto Protocol as mandated by Article 3 (9) of the Protocol.  On the other

Author is a lecturer of international law at the National Education University of Denpasar, and
member of Indonesian Advocate Association (PERADI). This article has been written to be a dissertation
for Master of Laws (LLM) in Environmental Law at the School of Law, the University of Nottingham, UK.
Author can be reached at <igam.wardana@yahoo.co.uk>

United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, adopted in 1992 during the UN
Conference on Environment and Development in Rio, Brazil, and entered to force in 1994

Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (the Kyoto
Protocol) was adopted in 1997 in Kyoto, Japan and entered into force in 2005

Article 3 (9) of the 1997 Kyoto Protocol states, “[c]ommitment for subsequent periods for Parties
included in Annex I shall be established in amendments to Annex B to this Protocol, which shall be adopted
in accordance with the provisions of Article 21, paragraph 7.” See Lin, Li Lim. (2010). We’ll Never Accept
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hand, some developed countries have argued that a new agreement would be
needed to replace the Kyoto Protocol for a more effective instrument .
Despite such disagreement, a new initiative to reduce emissions from
forestry sectors in developing countries is leaning to be “one of the key pillars
of a post-2012 international climate regime”. The initiative was first proposed
by Costa Rica and Papua New Guinea “on behalf of many supportive Nations”
in 2005. Furthermore, such initiative known as “Reduction Emissions from
Deforestation in Developing Countries” [RED] was launched officially during
COP 11 in Montreal in 2005 and to be negotiated through the Subsidiary Body
for Scientific and Technological Advice [SBSTA]. Later, RED has developed
further since COP 13 in Bali in 2007 into ”Reducing Emission from Deforestation
and Forest Degradation in Developing Countries” [REDD], then expanded
into “Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Forest Degradation in
Developing Countries plus Conservation, Sustainable Management of Forests
and Enhancement of Forest Carbon Stocks” [REDD+] during COP 14 in Poznan
in 2008.
Indeed, REDD+ is a mitigation strategy to address emissions from land
use and forestry sectors. According to the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate
Change [IPCC], they contribute up to 17.4% of global anthropogenic greenhouse
gas [GHG] emissions, or, according to Sir Nicholas Stern (2006:171), they are
responsible for 18% of global emissions and mostly are driven by deforestation
that occurs 30% in Indonesia and 20% in Brazil. Thus, a need to include
deforestation into the international climate change regime by adopting REDD+
seems obvious. According to Randall Abate, the REDD+ is supported by almost
all developed countries, including the US, and developing countries since it may
fill the gaps left by the Kyoto Protocol as being an insufficient instrument to
address global climate change. The gaps are: firstly, deforestation and forest
degradation, significant sources of GHG, are excluded due to its complex
methodological matters, potential leakage and loopholes; secondly, there is no
“sufficiently effective mechanisms for developing countries to have a meaningful
role in addressing climate change”; finally, the Protocol fails to bring the United
States to participate fully under the regime. Concluded by him, therefore, REDD+
would be a win-win solution to bring both developing and developed countries
on board of effective and efficient mitigation actions.
In fact, the concept of REDD+ seems simple but it may be very
complicated in its details and implementation. Many issues have been argued
both by proponents and by opponents of REDD+ with regard to technical and

2nd Kyoto Period, says Japan, Sparkling Doubts on KP’s Survival, Third World Network (TWN) Cancun
News Update 5 on 30 November 2010 (online) available at http://www.twnside.org.sg/   [accessed 9 July
2011]

Japan, for example, announced at the first day of COP 16 Cancun that it would not support the
extension of the Kyoto Protocol for the second commitment period. This position was followed by Russia,
Australia, Canada and New Zealand. See MarthinKhor, What to Expect in Cancun: Some Key Issues, Third
World Network (TWN) Cancun News Update 1 on 29 November 2010. Available at http://www.twnside.
org.sg/

E.Corbera and H. Schroeder, (2011). “Governing and Implementing REDD+”. 14 Environ. Sci. Policy,
2011. pp. 89-99

The “supportive nations” furthermore established the Coalition of Rainforest Nations, a
collaboration of forested tropical countries such as Congo, Costa Rica, Indonesia, and Ecuador. See Friends
of the Earth International (FoEI). (2008). REDD Myth: a Critical Review of Proposed Mechanisms to Reduce
Emissions from Deforestation and Degradation in Developing Countries. Amsterdam: FOEI. p.9
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methodological matters, negative impacts on leakage, sources of finance, as
well as on its guidance and safeguards. In response to this, a set of criterion
is used as a tool to assess whether the architecture of REDD+ being designed
could reach its objective to bring about climate effectiveness, cost efficiency,
equity outcomes and generate co-benefits [3E+ criterion]. ‘Effectiveness’ refers
to “the magnitude of the emission reduction achieved”. Effectiveness would be
depending on several factors, among others: political feasibility and commitment
from participating countries and more importantly depending on “the design of
the REDD model”. ‘Efficiency’ refers “to whether the given emission reduction is
achieved at a minimum cost”. ‘Equity’ is related to distribution of REDD+ costs
and benefits.10 Finally, ‘co-benefit’ refers to complementary benefit arising from
REDD+ activities, and in relation to the goals of other international agreements,
for example conservation of biodiversity and ecosystem services, and poverty
alleviation.11
Given the REDD+ would be a new scheme under the next international
climate regime, therefore, this paper aims to critically analyse the extent to
which the REDD+ architecture being designed in Indonesia may reach the 3E+
criterion. The areas of focus are mainly on thedevelopment of the REDD+ scheme,
including history, methodology, finance, and basic principles at the international
level; and the architecture of REDD+ in Indonesia, including law and policies,
institutional arrangements, and implementation of safeguards on the ground.
II. The International REDD+ Architecture
A. Climate Change and Forestry Sectors
Today, climate change is one of the biggest challenges facing international
community.12 The impacts of climate change such as sea level rise, loss of
biodiversity, food insecurity, floods, as well as climate refugees are resulting
from an increase in GHG concentration in the atmosphere. Concerned with
these impacts, in 1988, the UN General Assembly issued a Resolution 43/53
stated “climate change is common concern of humankind since climate is an
essential condition, which sustains life on earth”.13 Furthermore, the UN General
Assembly agreed to establish an Intergovernmental Negotiation Committee
[INC] in 1990.14 After several years negotiating, the INC produced a draft of
the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change [UNFCCC] that
was opened for signature during the 1992 UN Conference on Environment and
Development [UNCED] in Rio, Brazil. The Convention has come into force since
21st March 1994. In its 3rd Conference of Parties [COP 3] Kyoto, Japan, a protocol


A. Angelsen and S. Wertz-Kanounnikoff. (2008). What Are the Key Design Issues for REDD and the
Criteria for Assessing Options? in Moving Ahead with REDD: Issues, Options and Implications. Ed. by. Arild
Angelsen, p.8

Ibid., p.19
10
A. Angelsen (2009). Introduction in Realising REDD+: National Strategy and Policy Options. Ed.by.
Angelsen, p.5
11
Ibid., p.4
12
D. French, (1998). “1997 Kyoto Protocol to the 1992 UN Framework Convention on Climate
Change”. 10 Journal of Environmental Law. 1998. pp. 227-239
13
Paragraph 1 of the UNGA Resolution 43/53
14
UNGA Resolution 45/221. For historical development of the international climate change regime,
see Bodansky, D. (1993). The United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change: A Commentary, 18
Yale Journal of International Law 451-558
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was agreed to implement the framework convention, known as the 1997 Kyoto
Protocol.15
As far as sources of GHG are concerned, the IPCC differentiates the sources
into two categories, namely natural and anthropogenic sources of GHG.16 While
the natural sources are derived from natural phenomenon for example volcanic
eruptions, the anthropogenic sources are human-induced GHG emissions
through human activities for example burning fossil fuels, or land use, land-use
change and forestry (LULUCF). If burning of fossil fuels and cement production
has emitted CO2 around 270 gigatonnes (GtC) since the Industrial Revolution,
about 136 GtC of CO2 emissions has been emitted from land-use and forestry
sectors in which tropical deforestation is counted as the most significant
contributor.17 However, forest, in the context of climate change, has dual roles: as
a carbon sequester in which trees in forests absorb CO2 and store it through the
photosynthesis process; on the other hand, when its carbon stocks are released
to the atmosphere from deforestation and forest degradation [DD] activities,
forest becomes a major source of GHG emissions.18
Hence, forests particularly in the tropical forest regions are on the
spotlight. Tropical forests are covering 15% of the earth surface, containing 25%
of terrestrial carbon and 50% of biodiversity, and being a livelihood for millions
of indigenous and forest-dependent communities. Approximately 13 million
hectares of tropical forest, equaled to the size of the United Kingdom, disappear
every year, which take place 97% in tropical.19 Considering their importance in
sustaining life on earth and their contribution as the second largest sources of
GHG from DD, there is a vital need to involve forestry sectors under the climate
regime, namely the UNFCCC and the Kyoto Protocol.
1. The 1992 Climate Change Convention

In Article 1 (2) of the UNFCCC, climate change is defined as “a change of
climate which is attributed directly or indirectly to human activity that alters the
composition of the global atmosphere and which is in addition to natural climate
variability observed over comparable time period”. Unlike the definition given
by the IPCC that includes natural sources, the Convention seems primarily to
address the sources of greenhouse gases derived from human activities that are
not covered by the Montreal Protocol.20 Indeed, the UNFCCC covers a wide range
of activities, from transportation, industry, waste management, to forestry, and
regulates various substances from CO2 to Methane. In terms of the objective,
Article 2 of the Convention stipulates,
“the ultimate objective of this convention and any related legal instruments

D. French, Op.cit., pp. 227-239
See definition of climate change given by the panel in IPCC. (2007). Climate Change 2007:
Synthesis Report. n.p: IPCC. p.30
17
E. Trines, (2008). History and Context of LULUCF in the Climate Regime’ in Climate Change and
Forests: Emerging Policy and Market Opportunities . Ed.by. C. Streck et al, p.34
18
N. Angerand J. Sathaye, (2008). Reducing Deforestation and Trading Emissions: Economic
Implications for the Post-Kyoto Carbon Market, p.1
19
C. Parker, et al. (2007). The Little REDD Book, p.10; M. Huftyand A. Haakenstad, ”Reduced
Emissions for Deforestation and Degradation: A Critical Review”. 5 the Journal of Sustainable Development,
2011.  p.1-2
20
The Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete Ozone Layer to the Vienna Convention for the
Protection of the Ozone Layer is adopted in 1987 in Montreal, Canada and come into force on 1 January
1989
15
16
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that the conference of the Parties may adopt is to achieve, in accordance
with the relevant provisions of the Convention, stabilization of greenhouse
gas concentrations in the atmosphere at the level that would prevent
dangerous anthropogenic interference with the climate system.”
The phrase ‘ultimate objective’ above may be interpreted as an ongoing
objective of the Convention and may reflect the intention to set the Convention
as a framework agreement which needs a protocol or protocols to set its shortterm goals. In Article 3, the Convention stipulates, “in their actions to achieve
the objective of the Convention and to implement its provisions, the Parties
shall be guided…” by a set of principles, inter alia, the principle of common
but differentiated responsibilities, inter and intra generational equity, the
precautionary principle, as well as sustainable development. Article 3 (1), for
instance, emphasizes the importance to protect the climate system “for the
benefit of present and future generation of humankind, on the basis of equity
and in accordance with their common but differentiated responsibilities and
respective capabilities. Accordingly, the developed country Parties should take
the lead in combating climate change and the adverse effects”.
The provisions on commitments under Article 4 of the Convention divide
the commitments into general parties and specific parties (developed countries).
Several commitments are stipulated regarding land use and forestry activities. All
parties under Article 4 (1) shall undertake as follows: (a) developing, publishing
and making available their national inventories of anthropogenic emissions
by sources and removals by sinks of all GHG to the Conference of Parties; (b)
formulating, implementing, publishing and regularly updating national and
regional mitigation and adaptation programs; (c) cooperating and promoting the
development, diffusion and application, transfer of climate-friendly technology;
(d) promoting sustainable management of forests and cooperating in conserving
and enhancing sinks and reservoir of all GHG.
Specifically for developed countries, Article 4 (2)(a) mandates that
developed countries shall “adopt national policies and take corresponding
measures on the mitigation of climate change, by limiting its anthropogenic
emissions of greenhouse gases and protecting and enhancing its greenhouse gas
sink and reservoirs”. Article 4 (2) (b) stipulates that developed country parties
shall “communicate within six months of the entry into force of the convention for
it and periodically thereafter…detailed information on its policies and measures
referred to in subparagraph (a) above, as well as on its resulting projected
anthropogenic emissions by sources and removals by sinks of greenhouse gases
not controlled by the Montreal Protocol for period referred to in subparagraph
(a) [the end of the present decade], with the aim of returning individually and
jointly to their 1990 levels these anthropogenic emissions of carbon dioxide and
other greenhouse gases”.
Preamble of the 1992 Climate Change Convention is “aware of the role
and importance in terrestrial and marine ecosystems of sink and reservoirs” of
GHG. It also recognizes that “steps required to understand and address climate
change will be environmentally, socially and economically most effective if
they are based on relevant scientific, technical and economic considerations
and continually re-evaluated in the light of new findings in these areas”, and
affirms that “responses to climate change should be coordinated with social
and economic development in an integrated manner.” Furthermore, Article
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1 of the UNFCCC, reservoir is defined as “a component or components of the
climate system where a greenhouse gas or a precursor of greenhouse gas
is stored” and ‘sink’ is defined as “any process, activity or mechanism which
removes a greenhouse gas, an aerosol or a precursor of greenhouse gas from
the atmosphere”.
In general, it seems that the commitments of the Convention are poorly
drafted and often to be watered down by the language “taking into account their
common responsibility and their specific national and regional development
priorities, objectives and circumstances”. Specifically on forestry issues, it appears
that the issues are not really elaborated. Perhaps this is because as a framework
convention the Convention is intended to stipulate more general commitments
including general provisions on forestry sectors. One could argued that this
may be due to the fact that during the negotiation, forestry issues were very
contentious and considered as national sovereignty by some forested countries
for example Brazil. Hence, by putting an argument on the principle of common
but differentiated responsibility, tropical forested countries, mainly developing
countries, were reluctant to regulate forestry sectors under the climate regime
since it might affect their economic development. Moreover, another argument
is due to the lack of scientific finding and poorly informed negotiators on the
issues of forestry since climate change, at that time, was considered merely
about burning of fossil fuel. 21
2. The 1997 Kyoto Protocol

The 1997 Kyoto Protocol, coming into force in 2005, as the only legally
binding protocol to implement the UNFCCC. The Protocol requires developed
countries, either jointly or individually, to “ensure that their aggregate
anthropogenic carbon dioxide equivalent emissions of the greenhouse gases
listed in Annex A do not exceed their assigned amounts, calculated pursuant
to their quantified emission limitation and reduction commitments inscribed
in Annex A and in accordance with the provisions of this Article, with a view
to reducing their overall emissions of such gases by at least 5 per cent below
1990 levels in the commitment period 2008-2012".22 There are 42 developed
countries and the European Union that are listed as Annex 1 Parties to the
UNFCCC [Annex 1 Parties] which oblige to reduce several types of GHG emissions
stated in Annex A to the Kyoto Protocol with quantified emissions limitation or
reduction commitment stipulated by Annex B to the Protocol.
The Protocol also covers several activities that shall be undertaken
by parties. Article 2 (a) (ii), for instance, stipulates that Annex 1 Parties shall
undertake the implementation and/or further elaboration of policies and
measures in accordance with its national circumstances to protect and enhance
sinks and reservoirs of GHG, and the promotion of “sustainable forest management
practices” and “afforestation/reforestation”. Article 10 (b) stipulates that all
parties shall “formulate, implement, publish and regularly update national
and, where appropriate, regional programmes containing measures to mitigate
climate change and measures to facilitate adequate adaption to climate change”
including programmes and forestry.
21
See for example Streck, C. (2008) Forest, Carbon Markets, and Avoided Deforestation: Legal
Implications, 3 CCLR. 240
22
Article 3 (1) of the 1997 Kyoto Protocol
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In order to assist Annex 1 Parties meeting their commitment, there are
three flexible mechanisms set under the Protocol and guided by the Marrakesh
Accord23, namely the Joint Implementation, the Clean Development Mechanism,
and the Emission Trading. First of all, Joint Implementation (JI) is set under Article
6 of the Protocol to allows an Annex 1 Party earning emission reduction units
(ERUs) from a project to reduce or remove emissions in another Annex 1 Party
in which amount of reduction can be used to meet its commitment. 24 Secondly,
the Emission Trading (ET) scheme under Article 17 of the Kyoto Protocol allows
cooperation within Annex 1 Parties by buying and selling “Certified Emissions
Reductions” (CERs), “Assigned Amount Units” (AAUs), “Emissions Reduction
Units” (ERUs) or “Removal Units” (RMUs).25 Finally, the Clean Development
Mechanism (CDM) set under Article 12 of the Protocol allows an Annex 1 Party
to implement a project to reduce emissions in developing countries (Non-Annex
1 Parties). Amount of emissions reduction stated by Certified of Emissions
Reductions (CERs) arising form such project can be counted to meet the
reduction target of the Annex 1 Party or can be sold to other Annex 1 Parties. 26
In terms of LULUCF activities in the first Kyoto Protocol commitment
period, while the JI does not restrict and limit the implementation of LULUCF
activities, the inclusion of such activities is limited and restricted under the
CDM.27 Indeed, at the beginning, ‘avoided deforestation’ were proposed by
several countries to be an eligible LULUCF activity under the CDM. However,
the proposal was rejected due to the complexity of its methodology, namely
additionality, permanence, baseline, leakage as well as its possible negative
impacts on biodiversity.28 Another reason of such rejections was argued by the
EU, among others, saying that the integration CERs from avoided deforestation
activities into emission trading schemes might badly influence the development
of new climate-friendly technology and might drop the price of emission credits
from other sectors since Annex 1 Parties would likely use the cheaper credits
from avoided deforestation to meet their emission-reduction target.29 Therefore,
the compromise was the inclusion of Afforestation 30/Reforestation31 (A/R) as
the only LULUCF activities under the CDM since A/R activities are less complex
to measure and monitor.32

FCCC/CP/2001/13/Add.1
<http://unfccc.int/kyoto_protocol/mechanisms/joint_implementation/items/1674.php>   
accessed 9 July 2011
25
<http://unfccc.int/kyoto_protocol/mechanisms/emissions_trading/items/2731.php> accessed
9 July 2011
26
<http://unfccc.int/kyoto_protocol/mechanisms/clean_development_mechanism/items/2718.
php> accessed 9 July 2011
27
E. Trines, Op.cit., p. 34
28
M. Hufty and A. Haakenstad, Op.cit., p.3
29
J. Ebeling, (2008). Risk and Criticisms of Forestry-Based Climate Change Mitigation and Carbon
Trading in Climate Change and Forests: Emerging Policy and Market Opportunities. Ed.by. C. Streck et al,
p.44
30
Afforestation is “the direct human-induced conversion of land that has not been forested for
period of at least 50 years to forested land through planting, seeding and/or the human-induced promotion
of natural seed sources”. See Marrakesh Accords, FCCC/CP/2001/13/Add.1, para. 1(b) 58
31
Reforestation is “the direct human-induced conversion of non-forested land to forested land
through planting, seeding and/or the human-induced promotion of natural seed sources, on land that was
forested but that has been converted to non-forested land. For the first commitment period, reforestation
activities will be limited to reforestation occurring on those lands that did not contain forest on 31 December
1989”. See Marrakesh Accords, FCCC/CP/2001/13/Add.1, para. 1(b) 58
32
Ian Fry, “Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Forest Degradation: Opportunities and Pitfalls
23

24
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In fact, LULUCF rules under the Kyoto Protocol are contentious. The rules
have been criticized by many developing countries as lack of environmental
integrity since Annex 1 Parties may choose which activities they consider
to implement Article 3 (4) of the Protocol from forest management, revegetation, crop land management to grassing land management (FIELD
2011:6).33 Specifically on the A/R CDM, such scheme has no significant
influence in meeting the target of emission-reduction since it only reflects 1%
of the overall CDM projects during the first commitment period. The scheme
has arguably encouraged the expansion of monoculture plantation in some
developing countries due to, among others, its unclear modalities. Moreover,
LULUCF activities are less attractive to private sectors because of complicated
requirements and delayed procedures due to difficulty in reaching agreement,
which may influence the cost of implementation.34
B. Development of REDD+

While the REDD+ architecture is being designed, there are many strategies
in place at international levels to deal with forestry issues. One strategy mandated
by Article 8 (a) of the 1992 Convention of Biological Diversity is by establishing
protected areas, which have covered around 13.5% of all forest areas in the
world. Others strategies are through international agreements for example
the 2006 International Tropical Timber Agreement (IATT 2006), or through
multilateral forums led by either the Food and Agriculture Organisation (FAO)
or the United Nations Forum on Forests (UNFF), as well as through certification
schemes, among others, the Forest Stewardship Council (FSC). It is argued that
these strategies in certain circumstances have been able to encourage good
practices in forestry activities; when the rate of deforestation is taking into
account, however, they appears to be insufficient to decrease deforestation.
They are unable to create effective global forest governance since it is more
likely to be fragmented, segmented, incoherent, underfunded and even nonlegally binding.35
In this regard, it is expected that the future REDD+ scheme would fill the
gap of the existing strategies. Many observers seem optimistic with REDD+ since:
(1) REDD+ involves new strategies, namely ‘performed-based payment’; (2)
strong willingness to pay for REDD+ have been demonstrated by international
community; (3) a strong will to address DD has also been shown by many
developing countries by integrating REDD+ as a part of low carbon development;
(4) potential negative impacts of REDD+ are monitored and concerned by
many organizations and individuals helping international community to design
effective, efficient and equitable REDD+ schemes; (5) evidence on severe
impacts of climate change and the need to adapt and mitigate such impacts are
increasingly real and crucial.36
1. Road to the Bali Action Plan
in Developing a New Legal Regime”. 17 RECIEL, 2008. pp. 166-167
33
FIELD, (2011). Guide for REDD-plus Negotiators. Available at <www.field.org.uk> [accessed 27
June 2011]
34
J. Ebeling, Op.cit., pp. 43-44
35
M. Hufty and A. Haakenstad, Op.cit., p.2
36
F. Seymourand A. Angelsen, (2009). Summary and Conclusions: REDD Wine in Old Wineskins?’ in
Realising REDD+: National Strategy and Policy Options. Ed.by ArildAngelsen, pp. 302-303
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REDD+ as a ‘win-win’ solution for both developing and developed
countries has been developed rapidly under the UNFCCC process. Currently, many
architectures of REDD+ have been proposed and remain experimental until the
most suitable architecture is adopted in by parties under the post-2012 regime.
Historically, the first proposal for emission reduction from deforestation was
officially put on the table by Papua New Guinea and Costa Rica on behalf of other
supporting countries (the Coalition for Rainforest Nations) in COP 11 Montreal
2005. This proposal on “Reducing emissions from deforestation in developing
countries (RED): approaches to stimulate action” suggested the parties to
compensate or provide incentive for tropical forested countries in avoiding
deforestation. As a result, COP 11 Montreal in 2005 encouraged parties and
other accredited observers to put submissions on issues of emission-reduction
from deforestation in developing countries and requested the Secretariat to
conduct workshops on such issues.37
Three workshops have been organized under the auspices of the Subsidiary
Body for Scientific and Technological Advice (SBSTA). The first workshop was
on RED, 30 August-1 September 2006, in Rome, Italy, with three main issues,
namely (a) scientific, socio-economic, and methodological issues, including the
role of forests; (b) policy approaches and positive incentives including capacitybuilding and financial mechanisms; and (c) identification of possible links
between issues (a) and (b).38 Participants agreed that RED “should contribute
to the meeting the objective of the UNFCCC” and “to the alleviation of poverty”39,
taking into account the causes of deforestation, social-economic factors, and
their relationship with the possibility of leakage. 40 However, several points were
not really elaborated, namely methodology and financial sources. Neither did
the workshop discuss the potential impacts of RED on biodiversity and forestdependent communities.
The second workshop on RED was in Cairns, Australia, from 7 – 9 March
2007 in which two main issues were discussed. The first issue was regarding
“ongoing and potential policy approaches and positives incentives, and
technical and methodological requirements related to their implementation”,
and the second one was focusing on “improving the understanding” of RED.41
The participants noted the need of urgent actions to implement RED while
“ensuring the integrity of the international climate arrangement” 42, and the
need of building capacities and strengthening appropriate institutions to ensure
effective participation of developing countries.43 With regard to principles, RED
should be guided by “commonly agreed principles” including ‘effectiveness,
efficiency and appropriateness’ 44, polluter pays principles, the principle of
common but differentiated responsibilities, respect state sovereignty, and
the principle of equity and fairness.45 However, despite the fact that some
methodological matters were discussed intensively, the workshop was far from
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45

FCCC/CP/2005/5, para.81
FCCC/SBSTA/2006/10, para.3
FCCC/SBSTA/2006/10, para.50
FCCC/SBSTA/2006/10, para.52
FCCC/SBSTA/2007/3, para.2
FCCC/SBSTA/2007/3, para.37
FCCC/SBSTA/2007/3, para.38
FCCC/SBSTA/2007/3, para.43
FCCC/SBSTA/2007/3, para.44
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reaching an agreement on such matters. Debates on baseline or reference levels,
definitional issues, permanence and leakage as well as sources of finance were
the most contentious topics.46
Finally, the third workshop was on “Methodological Issues Relating to
Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Forest Degradation in Developing
Countries” held on 25–27 June 2008 in Tokyo, Japan. Before the workshop,
at the twenty-sixth session of the SBSTA Meeting in Bonn 2007, the SBSTA
issued a proposed draft to be adopted in COP 13 Bali, December 2007. Some
provisions on the proposed draft were optional in language by putting brackets
or phrases ‘taking into account’, ‘taking note of’, or ‘as appropriate’47 for several
controversial issues, namely whether national circumstances of developing
countries as proposed by some parties48 and the report of the Second Workshop
should be expressed explicitly in the text 49. The draft also proposed recognition
of the ‘effort and action to reduce deforestation, maintain, and conserve forest
stocks’ that have taken place in developing countries.50 This provision was trying
to expand the scope of RED, as proposed by India, and Costa Rica, to include
conservation and sustainable forest management practiced in developing
countries.51
At the Bonn meeting shortly before COP 13, parties agreed that RED
“can promote co-benefit and may complement the aims and objectives of
other relevant international conventions and agreements”. This means that
the parties were aware that addressing deforestation should not be isolated
from the social-economic factors that drive deforestation and should learn
from the weaknesses of previous forest-related regimes. Still, the issues of
forest-dependent communities were not elaborated in the draft although some
countries, among others, Bolivia, raised their concern on the impacts of RED on
indigenous peoples and local communities during the meeting.
2. Bali Action Plan and Beyond

During COP 13 Bali, Indonesia, based on the draft text provided by the
SBSTA Meeting in Bonn 2007, the parties were negotiating RED. After more than
two weeks negotiating, they agreed to release the Bali Action Plan as a road
map to the next international climate change regime (post-2012) and widened
the scope of RED to cover forest degradation, becoming “Reduction Emissions
from Deforestation and Forest Degradation in Developing Countries” (REDD.)
It seems clear that REDD would play an essential role in the 2012 international
climate regime as it received special attention at COP 13. Indeed, the Bali Action
Plan in its Decision 1/CP.13, Paragraph 1, decides
“to launch a comprehensive process to enable the full, effective and
sustained implementation of the Convention through long-term cooperative
action, now, up to and beyond 2012, in order to reach an agreed outcome
See FCCC/SBSTA/2007/3, paras.45-86
FCCC/SBSTA/2007/L.10, para.6 (options 1)
48
See FCCC/SBSTA/2007/MISC.2
49
See FCCC/SBSTA/2007/3
50
FCCC/SBSTA/2007/L.10, preamble
51
See also The Ministry of Environment and Forests of India. (2009). Climate Change Negotiations:
India’s Submission to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (online) available at
<moef.nic.in/downloads/home/UNFCCC-final.pdf> [accessed 20 August 2011] p.26
46
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and adopt a decision at its fifteenth session, by addressing…(b) [e]nhanced
national/international action on mitigation of climate change, including…
consideration of…(iii) [p]olicy approaches and positive incentives on
issues relating to reducing emissions from deforestation and forest
degradation in developing countries; and the role of conservation,
sustainable management of forests and enhancement of forest carbon
stocks in developing countries".52 [emphasis added]

In COP 13, the REDD initiative was intended to be part of mitigation
actions from forestry sectors in developing countries. However, it is unclear how
the initiative would relate to Land Use, Land-Use Change and Forestry (LULUCF)
and A/R CDM that have been exist under the Kyoto Protocol. In Decision 2/
CP.13 on “Reducing Emissions from Deforestation in Developing Countries:
Approaches to Stimulate Action”, several points proposed by the draft text of
the SBSTA were compromised but some new issues were agreed. Instead of
using phrase ‘concerning’ the contribution of emissions from deforestation,
the preamble uses ‘acknowledging’ the contribution of such emissions from
deforestation as moderation 53. The potential role of reducing emissions from
DD in developing countries is also recognised as an actions in “helping to meet
the ultimate objective of the Convention”. 54
Issues concerning the potential impacts of REDD on indigenous peoples
and local communities are also mentioned by recognising that the needs of such
peoples and communities should be addressed. Moreover, in Decision 2/CP.13,
parties are invited to “further strengthen and support ongoing efforts to reduce
emissions from deforestation and forest degradation on a voluntary basis”. The
parties are also encouraged to “support, provide technical assistance, facilitate
the transfer of technology” in building the capacity of developing countries
on methodological approaches including collecting, reporting and monitoring
as well as arranging appropriate institutions.55 As the first official adoption of
REDD, the Decision seems to focus mostly on general provisions in order to
put all parties on board by avoiding the controversial issues for example on the
issues of financial resources.
However, the Bali Action Plan does provide an indicative guidance in its
annex. Several points adopted in the guidance are as follow: “demonstration
activities should be undertaken with the approval of the host Party”; estimation
of emission reduction should be “result based, demonstrable, transparent and
verifiable, and estimated consistently over time”; emission reduction should
be based on “historical emissions”; and the use of ‘independent expert review’
is encouraged.56 Furthermore, REDD is mandated to be negotiated under two
tracks, namely in the Ad Hoc Working Group on Long Term Cooperative Action
(AW-LCA)57 on the issues of REDD policy approaches and in the SBSTA on the

FCCC/CP/2007/6/Add.1, p.3
See Decision 2/CP.13, FCCC/CP/2007/6/Add.1, preamble
54
See Decision 2/CP.13 (n 58)
55
Decision 2/CP.13 (n 58)para.1
56
Annex of Decision 2/CP.13, FCCC/CP/2007/6/Add.1 adopted on 8th Plenary Meeting, 14-15
December 2007
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Ad Hoc Working Group on Long-Term Cooperative Action (AW-LCA) is a working group
established by the Bali Action Plan focusing on the development of cooperation between Annex 1 and NonAnnex 1 Countries on the issues of mitigation, adaptation, transfer of technology, and finance. Together
with the Ad Hoc Working Group on the Further Commitment of Annex 1 Countries under the Kyoto Protocol
52
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issues of technical aspects.58
REDD has been further developed by other COP Decisions, namely by
COP 14 Poznan in 2008, and COP 15 Copenhagen in 2009 as well as by COP 16
Cancun in 2010. In Poznan, the provisions “the role of conservation, sustainable
management of forests and enhancement of forest carbon stocks” after semi colon
in Decision 1/CP.13 (the Bali Action Plan) was developed as an integral part of
the REDD initiative. Thus, the scope of the initiative has expanded further from
(REDD) into “Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Forest Degradation
in Developing Countries plus Conservation, Sustainable Management of Forests
and Enhancement of Carbon Stocks” (REDD-plus or REDD+).59
In COP 15 Copenhagen in 2009, financial source of REDD+ was given a
special attention. Paragraph 6 of the Copenhagen Accord recognises the need
to establish the REDD+ mechanism immediately “to enable the mobilisation
of financial resources” including from markets.60 In the Decision 4/CP.15,
developing countries are requested to identify drivers of DD and activities that
reduce emissions, increase removals and stabilise forest carbon stocks, as well
as to establish “robust and transparent national forest monitoring systems”.61
In the context of indigenous groups and local communities, although
the preamble of the Decision 4/CP.5 recognises “the need for full and effective
engagement of indigenous peoples and local communities”, this provision seems
to be watered down by Paragraph 3 by giving qualification ‘as appropriate’ to
develop guidance for such engagement. Some delegates criticised the Copenhagen
Accord as an attempt to replace the Kyoto Protocol and rejected the adoption
of it. However, for others, the Accord was considered as a win-win agreement
between developing and developed countries due to the involvement of the US
that is not a party to the Kyoto Protocol and the pledges from developed countries
to mobilise financial resources that are needed by developing countries in their
immediate adaption programmes. Finally, the Accord just took ‘note of’ by the
parties.
The Cancun Agreement, the decision of COP 16, encourages developing
countries to contribute “to mitigation actions in the forestry sectors by
undertaking the following activities: (a) reducing emissions from deforestation;
(b) reducing emissions from forest degradation; (c) conservation of forest carbon
stocks; (d) sustainable management of forests; and (e) enhancement of forest
carbon stocks”.62 In addition, they are also requested to develop “(a) a national
strategy or action plan; (b) a national forest reference emission level and/or
forest reference level; (c) a robust and transparent national forest monitoring
system; (d) a system for providing information on how the safeguard…are
being addressed”.63 Developing countries shall also “address the drivers of
deforestation and forest degradation, land tenure issues, forest governance
issues, gender considerations, and the safeguard (Appendix 1)”, and ensure
(AW-KP), the AW-LCA was mandated to report to the COP 15 in Copenhagen, Denmark.
58
V. Hollowayand E. Giandomenico (2009).Carbon Planet White Paper: The History of REDD Policy,
p.13
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FCCC/SBSTA/2008/L.23, para.6
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See FCCC/CP/2009/11.add.1
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Decision 2/CP.15, FCCC/CP/2009/11/Add.1, para.1,
62
Decision 1/CP.16, FCCC/CP/2010/7/Add.1, para.70,
Decision 1/CP.16 (n 67) para.71
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“full and effective participation of relevant stakeholders” including indigenous
groups and local communities.64
With regard to financial sources of REDD+, the AW-LCA was mandated
to explore the financing options and to report its recommendation in COP 17
Durban, South Africa in 2011.65
From the beginning, an initiative to have avoided deforestation seems
controversial, especially in the context of the rights of indigenous peoples and
local communities. Long experience of injustices and consideration of forest
as a livelihood, indigenous peoples and local communities have raised their
concerns on how avoided deforestation could affect their way of life and rights.
Their voices have been represented by some countries especially Bolivia 66,
NGOs like Friends of the Earth International67 or Forest People Programme68 or
even grassroots organisations like Indigenous Environmental Network.69 In fact,
not until COP 14 Poznan in 2008, their voice had not been taken seriously, since
parties appeared to be more concerned on putting the REDD scheme in place as
soon as possible.
In response to many concerns raised by some Parties, NGOs and
indigenous groups, the Cancun Agreement is complemented by an Appendix 1
on “guidance and safeguard for policy approaches and positive incentives on
issues relating to reducing emissions from deforestation and forest degradation
in developing countries; and the role of conservation, sustainable management
of forests and enhancement of forest carbon stocks in developing countries”
[Appendix 1 on REDD+ Guidance and Safeguard]. Paragraph 1 of the Appendix 1
provides guidance on several contentious issues including the fact that REDD+
should contribute to the achievement of the ultimate objective the UNFCCC and
the fulfilment of the commitment from developed countries in terms of financial
support. In addition, REDD+ should be voluntary and result based, “consistent
with national sustainable development needs and goals” and “in the context of
sustainable development and reducing poverty” with “adequate and predictable
financial and technological” support.70
In addition, the safeguard highlights several issues. Among them are
concerning: transparency and effectiveness of forest governance; respect to “the
knowledge and rights of indigenous peoples and members of local communities”
as well as their full and effective participation; biodiversity by ensuring that
REDD+ is not used to encourage conversion of natural forests to monoculture
plantation; leakage by addressing “the risk of reversal”.71 However, instead of
explicitly putting the issues concerned above as an obligation to comply with,
such concerns appear to be undermined by a weak language that the safeguards
should be “promoted and supported”. In addition, the Cancun Agreement is also

Decision 1/CP.16 (n 67) para.72
Decision 1/CP.16 (n 67) para.77
See Bolivian Submission to AWG-LCA on Universal Declaration on the Rights of Mother Earth
67
See Friends of the Earth International (FoEI). (2008). REDD Myth: a Critical Review of Proposed
Mechanisms to Reduce Emissions from Deforestation and Degradation in Developing Countries. Amsterdam:
FOEI
68
See T. Griffiths, (2008). Seeing ‘REDD’?: Forest, Climate Change Mitigation and the Rights of
Indigenous Peoples and Local Communities. UK: Forest People Programme
69
See a join publication of social movement on REDD+ in Cabello, J., and Gilberston T. (n.d) No
REDD. Mexico: Carbon Trade Watch and Indigenous Environmental Network
70
Appendix 1 on REDD+ Guidance and Safeguard, FCCC/CP/2010/7/Add.1, para.1,
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Appendix 1 on REDD+ Guidance and Safeguard. supra note 75. para.2
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absence of compliance mechanisms.72 Although the safeguards are essential for
an effective and equitable the REDD+ mechanism, it remains unclear what the
legal consequences would be if the safeguards are violated.
C.

The REDD+ Building Blocks

In designing the REDD+ architecture, four basic building blocks are being
discussed under the UNFCCC, namely scope, reference levels, financing and
distribution.
1. Scope

First of all, the scope refers to what types of emissions-reduction
activities are covered by REDD+.73 As far as the scope of REDD+ is concerned,
it seems clear as stated in the Cancun Agreement, the most current decision
of the UNFCCC, that REDD+ covers the following activities: (1) reducing
emissions from deforestation; (2) reducing emission from forest degradation;
(3) conservation; (4) sustainable management of forests; and (5) enhancement
of forest carbon stocks. The accommodation of such activities seems to be “an
important compromise reached between those who wanted REDD+ to be solely
about deforestation and those who want it to expand to other land uses”74
for example Agriculture, Forestry and Other Land Uses (AFOLU). Bolivia even
went further to propose deletion of words ‘emissions reduction’ and proposing
“reducing deforestation and forest degradation” instead, as Bolivia concerned
that forest carbon would be the overriding interests in protecting forests while
ignoring other values of them. Bolivia’s proposal was, however, rejected by other
parties in COP 16 Cancun.75
In relation to the scope, definitional issues are essential to determine the
eligible activities in achieving the REDD+ effectiveness, efficiency, equity and
co-benefit (3E+). In fact, in the context of REDD+, definitions of ‘forest’, and
‘deforestation’ are very important but until now no agreement reached on these
matters.76 While the Decision 16/CMP.1 on LULUCF rules under the Kyoto Protocol
agree to adopt previous decisions with regard to definitions, modalities, and
guidelines for the post-2012 LULUCF activities 77, it remains unclear whether or
not the LULUCF rules on definitional issues would be transferred directly to the
REDD+ scheme. This is due to inconclusive relation between the Kyoto Protocol
and the future of REDD+. If the definitions from LULUCF rules were transferred
to REDD+, new problems would occurred in REDD+ implementation. ‘Forest’,
for instance, under the LULUCF rules, is defined as
“a minimum area of land of 0.05-1.0 hectares with tree crown cover (or
equivalent stocking level) of more than 10-30 per cent with trees with the
potential to reach a minimum height of 2-5 meters at maturity in situ. A
forest may consist either of closed forest formations where trees of various

72
Chris Lang, (2011). Why REDD+ is Dangerous. Available at <http://www.redd-monitor.
org/2011/02/05/why-redd-is-dangerous-in-its-current-form/>
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C. Parker, Op.cit., p.20
74
A. La Vina, (2010). The Future of REDD-Plus: Pathways of Convergence for the UNFCCC Negotiations
and the Partnership, p.7
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Chris Lang, Op.Cit., p.77
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See Decision 16/CMP 1, FCCC/CMP/2005/8/Add.3, para.4
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storeys and undergrowth cover a high proportion of the ground or open
forest. Young natural stands and all plantations which have yet to reach a
crown density of 10-30 per cent of tree height of 2-5 meters are included
under forest, as are areas normally forming part of the forest area which are
temporarily unstocked as a result of human intervention such as harvesting
or natural causes but which are expected to revert to forest”78 (emphasis
added)

Definition of forest above seems merely based on a quantitative
perspective. In fact, this would deny a qualitative perspective of forest that
refers to biodiversity ‘within species, between species and of ecosystem’,79 upon
which resilience in providing ecosystem services depends. If REDD+ focuses
on the quantitative definition of forest, it may encourage conversion of forest
into monoculture and commercial tree plantation. As a result, this may risk
biodiversity and increase ‘inter-ecosystem leakage’ that is “increased pressure
on non-forest ecosystems with high relevance for biodiversity conservation
caused by a successful reduction of deforestation”.80 In addition, defining and
measuring ‘forest degradation’ are not less straightforward in this regard. This is
why the inclusion of ‘forest degradation’ into RED initiative was contentious for
some countries although they finally agreed to include it as a compromise.
Moreover, the inclusion of SMF and ‘enhancement of forest carbon
stocks’ is also controversial due to their multiple interpretations. ‘Sustainable
management of forests’ (SMF) is interchangeable with ‘sustainable forest
management’ (SFM), in which the latter is rather a controversial term in the
context of operation of logging or plantation companies since they have
been unable to manage forest in sustainable manner, and even have created
conflicts within indigenous territories 81. On top of that, both sustainable forest
management and enhancement of forest carbon stocks activities are argued to
have negative impacts on biodiversity due to their unclear criteria.82 Therefore,
the scope of REDD+ designed so far appears difficult to generate co-benefit, and
to be effective and equitable, since the scope arguably opens loopholes and is
problematic even at the basic definitional levels.
2. Reference Levels

The reference level refers to periods or scales against which emissionreduction will be measured. Reference levels or baselines, however, may mean
two things; firstly, reference levels or baseline may refer to a prediction about
the possible outcome if REDD+ is not undertaken or “business-as-usual” (BAU)
scenario, or as the “benchmark for measuring the effect of a REDD+ intervention”;
secondly, it may be interpreted as a baseline for crediting REDD+ activities, or as

Marrakesh Accords, FCCC/CP/2001/13/Add.1, Annex, para.1 (a), 58
Article 2(1) of the 1992 Convention Biological Diversity
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the ‘benchmark’ for incentives for a REDD+ carbon right holder.83 In this regard,
there are three options on the table such as a ‘historical baseline’, a ‘historical
adjusted baseline’, and a ‘projected baseline’. Furthermore, each option should
be measured against three optional scales, namely ‘sub-national’, ‘national’, and
‘global’ scales.84
The historical baseline refers to the idea that a proxy for future
deforestation behavior is based on its past rates of deforestation. However,
the historical baseline requires data on deforestation rates in which such data
is difficult to obtain if not unavailable in many developing countries, and the
historical baseline does not take changing in circumstances time to time into
account.85 In order to respond to the weaknesses of the historical baselines, the
projected baselines have been proposed by parties. The projected baselines are
based on prediction of deforestation rates in the future that may use various
methods of measurements, for example by using econometric to analyze the
underlying socio-economic or structural pressures leading to deforestation.The
biggest concern for the projected baselines is to decide the accurate variables
that are likely to be the most significant drivers of deforestation in a country.
Another approach is the historical adjusted baseline based on combination
between ‘pure historical baseline and projected baseline’. Using a Development
Adjusted Factor (DAF) to be applied to the historical baseline, it is expected that
the future drivers of deforestation could be predicted.86 However, until now, no
agreement has reached on how to set a reference level among experts 87, while
every participating country or project developer uses its own references in
developing REDD+ demonstration projects.
Furthermore, reference levels should be connected to the scale of REDD+.
In this regard, at least there are three approaches put on the table. The first one
is a national approach based on a national baseline or reference scenario. 88The
second is sub-national approach based on project-based reference levels or
baseline and this would operate under similar modalities to CDM projects.89 The
sub-national approach is chosen because it allows a developing country that
has no capacity to establish national carbon accounting systems, and is more
attractive for private sectors since they could directly monitor the project. Finally,
a ‘nested approach’ is being proposed to provide incentive for REDD+ activities
at both sub-national and national levels. Under this approach, a country may
start a reference level from a sub-national scale, which will then be scaled up
into a national level for the next stage simultaneously with building its capacity
to develop national carbon accounting systems.90
The main concerns of such approaches are their possibility of leakage
and problems regarding additionality and permanence. Leakage is “a situation
in which deforestation avoided in one area results in deforestation in another,
whether within or between countries, which could severely undermine the
83
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effectiveness of REDD”.91 Leakage can be differentiated into two main categories
such as: (1) ‘activity shifting’ as the case when an activity displaces from one
area to another as a result of REDD+ implementation in such area; (2) ‘indirect
market leakage’ when leakage occurs due to the ‘market law of supply and
demand’.92
In terms of additionality, REDD+ shall be able to reduce emissions from
DD greater than business-as-usual scenario. Closely linked to additionality,
permanence requires REDD+ activities to maintain carbon forest stocks in
trees over time. With regard to a non-performing REDD+ project, in fact, many
solutions have been proposed to compensate the loss arising from the failure of
a REDD+ project to address leakage, permanence and additionality once credits
have been distributed. The proposed solutions include insurance policies, shared
liability, temporary crediting, long-term accounting, etc.93
However, if leakage cannot be addressed, additionality and permanence
is lacking, REDD+ will become the part of the climate problem. A failed REDD+
mechanism, instead of achieving the ultimate objectives of the UNFCCC,
would reverse the situation as it may provide pseudo solution to make parties
continually emitting emissions without felling guilty to do so. This tendency has
been shown by at least 20 percent of CDM projects in which additionality of
such projects was miscalculated.94
Potential international leakage also has evidently occurred. For example,
it is likely that major palm oil companies in Indonesia plan to move to African
countries due to Indonesia’s policy on a 2-year moratorium for forest conversion
as a result of national policy on REDD+.95  Moreover, a wide range of options to
compensate the (economic) loss would not be able to compensate GHG emitted
to the atmosphere by the failure of non-performing projects. As a result, the
earth’s temperature would continue to increase and the impacts of climate
change would even be worse. Therefore, a failed REDD+ mechanism is possible
to be a distraction for parties to delay taking actions timely with real solutions
to climate change.
3. Financing and Distribution

One of the most controversial building blocks, arguably, is financing and
distribution. Financing in this context refers to the sources of finance as direct
revenue to provide incentive for an emission-reduction activity under the REDD+
scheme; meanwhile, distribution refers to options in distributing or allocating
benefits as financial incentives to countries that maintain their forests standing
despite the fact that they are not directly participating in REDD+ activities.
96
Indeed, the purpose of a distribution mechanism is to address concerns on
equity of REDD+. More importantly, it is to avoid international leakage that is
moving deforestation from a country with REDD+ activities to another country
without REDD+ activities. The argument is that if a High Forest Cover, Low
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Deforestation Rates (HFDL)97 country is not rewarded in protecting its forest
carbon stocks, the country will be likely to deforest for more profitable revenues
when demands on forest products in global market increase.98
There are several options in financing REDD+, namely ‘carbon market’,
‘market-linked’, ‘voluntary’, and the ‘phased approach’. First of all, REDD+ under
carbon market schemes would issue a credit similar to a CER under the CDM, in
which such credit could be counted in meeting emissions reduction or compliance
targets.99 Secondly, REDD+ activities could also generate sources of finance from
various mechanisms under a market-linked approach, for example auction of
emissions allowances. Although emission reduction is not their main objective,
if they are able to reduce emissions, the amount of reduction may be counted to
meet emission-reduction targets.100 Finally, REDD+ under a voluntary funding
mechanism could generate sources of finance through Official Development
Assistance (ODA) and other bilateral and multilateral sources. In fact, the key
element under such a mechanism is that emissions reduced by REDD+ activities
cannot be counted toward meeting compliance targets.101
Alternatively, under the ‘phased approach’ REDD+ mechanism is divided
into 3 phases, namely ‘Readiness’, ‘More Advance Readiness’, and ‘Compliance’
phases.102 Thus, the sources of finance are generated depending on which
phase of a REDD+ activity is taking place. A voluntary funding mechanism, for
instance, is more suitable for the Readiness phase in which capacity building
and demonstration activities are being developed.103 A REDD+ activity in the
Advance Readiness in which scaling up REDD+ activities are taking place is
argued to be more appropriate to use market-linked approach, for example from
the auctioning of carbon allowances.104 In fact, REDD+ under the compliance
phase is argued to be likely to generate sources of finance from both carbon
market and market-linked mechanisms since under this phase more consistent
and long-terms financial sources are needed.105
However, the proposal to use carbon market as the financial source of
REDD+ seems highly controversial for some reasons. A study conducted by the
Centre for European Economic Research in 2008 concluded that integration of
REDD+ into existing carbon market could decrease the price of international
carbon permit by half because a REDD+ credit supplied from tropical rainforest
regions is cheaper.106 Moreover, an estimation from the Eliasch Review indicates
that although an annual cost of US$17-33 billion is needed for halving forestrelated emissions by 2030, only US$70 billion by 2020 can be provided by

97
The Forest Transitional Theory which classifies forested countries into five stages, namely
(1) High Forest Cover, Low Deforestation Rates (HFLD); (2) High Forest Cover, High Deforestation Rates
(HFHD); (3) Low Forest Cover, High Deforestation Rates (LFHD); (4) Low Forest Cover, Low Deforestation
Rates (LFLD); and, (5) Low Forest Cover, Negative Deforestation Rates. See Angelsen, A. supra note 14.p.4
98
C. Parker. et al., Op.cit.
99
Ibid., p.26
100
Ibid.
101
Ibid.
102
S. Wertz-Kanounnikoff and A. Angelsen, (2009). Global and National REDD+ Architecture: Linking
Institutions and Actions in Realising REDD+: National Strategy and Policy Options. Ed.by. ArildAngelsen.
Denmark: CIFOR, p.15
103
C. Parker. et al., Op.cit. p.92
104
Ibid.
105
Ibid.
106
N. Angerand J. Sathaye, (2008). Reducing Deforestation and Trading Emissions: Economic
Implications for the Post-Kyoto Carbon Market, p. 23

Year 2 Vol. 1, January - April 2012

INDONESIA Law Review

~ 93 ~

carbon market schemes.107 Thus, public fund will still be required because
market cannot provide enough financial sources.
Moreover, carbon market is a very complex system in which the carbon
price is also fluctuating. When the price goes drop, indigenous peoples and local
communities who have given up their livelihood to be set as a REDD+ project
would be under serious threats of becoming the victim for the second times due
to inadequate payments after losing their livelihood.108
With regard to the building block on distribution, there are two options
being proposed, namely a ‘redistribution mechanism’ or an ‘additional
mechanism’. Firstly, the redistribution mechanism is based on a global baseline
that allocate revenues to the High Forest Cover, Low Deforestation Rate (HFLD)
countries with deforestation rates below the global average.109 Secondly, the
additional mechanism uses additional funding from various sources in avoiding
international leakage and addressing equity between HFDL countries.110
Several possible sources are including ‘voluntary fund’ or ‘innovative finance
mechanisms’ such as levies on aviation and shipping or the auctioning of
allowances. However, at the local levels, distribution may raise several problems
regarding which parties are the most appropriate one to receive such incentives.
Indeed, distribution is closely linked to the carbon right holder that is determined
by the owner of the forests concerned. In many cases, local communities and
indigenous peoples often have no title or land right over forest they live in; thus,
it seems unlikely that they would be the beneficiaries under these distributional
schemes.
III. REDD+ in Indonesia

A. The National REDD+ Architecture
Diverse architectures of REDD+ are being designed on the ground. This
reflects different circumstances of developing countries as well as national
expectation to the future REDD+ scheme. According to UN-REDD, there are more
than hundreds REDD+ projects as a part of learning process for establishing an
international REDD+ scheme. In Indonesia alone, the REDD+ architectures are
designed through demonstration projects that have spread out the country since
2007 [15 projects in Borneo, 10 projects in Sumatera, 2 in Java, 3 in Sulawesi and
5 projects in Papua] with various size of each project ranging from 10,000 ha to
4.2 million ha.111 In analysing critically the extent to which such architectures
are able to contribute to the objectives of REDD+, this section discusses REDD+
in Indonesia by focusing on its model, related laws and policies, institutional
arrangements, as well as safeguards and co-benefits.
1. Indonesia, Climate Change and Deforestation

Indonesia is an archipelagic country consisted of more than 17,000 islands
with an area of 2 million square km and population at around 238 million people
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across 33 provinces, and they are diverse in culture and ethnicities.112 In forestry
issues, the Food and Agriculture Organisation (FAO) considers Indonesia as a
country among other ten most rapid deforested countries in which during 20052010 it was estimated that forest cover declined about 3.42 million ha, and
during 1990-2010 it declined by 24.1 million ha.113 Indonesia is also regarded
as the largest GHG emitter from land use, LULUCF.114 As an archipelago, in fact,
Indonesia is one of the most vulnerable countries from the impacts of climate
change particularly rising in sea levels and it is predicted that around 3,000
islands would be under water.115
Globally, deforestation rates and land-use change are at 6 million ha every
year. If this pattern continues, it is predicted that around 15% of remaining
forests would be lost by 2015, and around 70% of them would disappear by
the next two hundreds years.116 In the climate change context, the remaining
forests are estimated to store around 638 GtC in which around 283 GtC of them
is forests biomass. This amount of carbon stored by forests is significantly
huge and more than carbon in the atmosphere.117 Deforestation on dry land
and peat swamps during 2000–2005 was estimated to emit up to 2.479 million
tCO2e and if the additional peat fires was counted, the amount raised up to 502
million tCO2e.118 In Indonesia alone, while Indonesia’s forests contain around
13,143–25,547 MtCO2 forest carbon stocks, carbon emissions from DD are
calculated approximately 55 MtCO2e.119 According to the FAO’s 2005 Forest
Report Assessment, the rate of deforestation in Indonesia is estimated around
1.9 million ha annually in which dry land forests and peat swamps as two most
significant sources. Borneo (Kalimantan) and Sumatera are the biggest emitters
of GHG from deforestation with estimation of 84% of Indonesia’s total emissions
from LULUCF.120 Based on historical data, the deforestation rate in Indonesia is
projected to be 1.125 million ha annually.121
The complex forest governance has become one of the most important
issues in Indonesia. Forests in Indonesia so called ‘state forests’ are managed
into four categories, namely production forest, protection forest, conservation
forest and conversion forest. During period of 1965–2001, the Ministry of
Forestry had an exclusive authority to manage forestry sectors. However, since
the era of decentralisation in 2001, there has been a delegation of responsibility
and decision-making authority to districts level, although the Ministry remains
powerful in deciding a status of state forests. In fact, such delegation in many
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cases opens a vacuum of forest governance benefitting local elites, companies
and illegal loggers. Instead of encouraging forest management in sustainable
manner and good governance, many governments at district levels have used
forests for generating revenue and maintaining the culture of corruption.122 On
the other hand, state forests that cover more than 70% of the total Indonesian
terrestrial areas are inhabited by 40 – 65 million people. According to the
Ministry of Forestry, these people do not have title of ownership so that a permit
issued by the Ministry is required if they want to use forest areas.123
In terms of drivers of deforestation in Indonesia, the Government of
Indonesia (GoI) devides them into two categories. The first category is planned
drivers that include palm oil plantation as well as pulp and paper concession up
to 10 million since 2007; and, community timber plantation up to 5.4 million
ha by 2016.124 In fact, by 2008, fast growing tree plantation covered around 2%
of the total land area in Indonesia or around 4.3 million ha. In many instances
the plantation was subsidised by government spending and received extra
economic benefits from timber clearance revenue when opening forests for
the plantation.125 Palm oil plantations, which also receive similar benefits, have
expanded more than 40 times since 1967, and in 2010 it was estimated that
they covered 4% of the total Indonesia’s land area or around 7.3 million ha.126
The second category is unplanned drivers, which include illegal logging both
large and small scales, lack of monitoring capacity, unsustainable practices in
managing forest and etc.127
2. REDD+ Related Law and Policies

Prior REDD+ rapid development, Indonesia has had several legal and
policy frameworks on forest protection. Despite the fact that they do not
specifically have objectives to cut GHG emissions, they seem relevant to the forest
carbon context, among others: Presidential Decree No.32/1990 prohibiting
development on peat with more than 3 meters deep; Government Regulation PP
No.4/2001 prohibiting the use of fire in forestry activities; Ministerial Decree
SK 159/Menhut-II/2004 on the restoration of degraded ecosystem within
production forests; Presidential Instruction No. 4/2005 on illegal logging;
Government Regulation PP No.6/2006 on forest management and utilisation;
Ministerial Decree No.260/1995 on Guidelines for Fire Control and Prevention;
Law No.41/1999 on Forestry and Law No.5/1990 on Biological Diversity
Conservation.
Development of REDD in Indonesia could be dated back shortly before
COP 13 Bali, Indonesia, in December 2007. In the late 2006, the Government
of Indonesia (GoI) established the Indonesia Forest Carbon Alliance [IFCA],
a working group to assess and assist Indonesia in reducing emissions from
forestry sectors in which after COP 13, the IFCA was able to publish a report
called the IFCA Consolidation Report and becoming a reference work on REDD
in Indonesia.128 Moreover, an announcement of President Yudhoyono during
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the G20 Meeting in 2009 that Indonesia committed to reduce its domestic
emissions by 26% below Business as Usual (BAU) scenario by 2020, or 41%
below BAU with international supports has become one of the most influential
factors in this regard.129 As the first commitment made by a developing country,
the announcement has pushed all the governments’ sectors in Indonesia to
undertake climate change programmes seriously, to compile such programmes
to the Indonesian Climate Change Sectoral Road Map 130, and to integrate them
into a Long-term National Development Plan 2005-2025.131
The Indonesian Ministry of Forestry has responded by establishing
framework to control the process of REDD development, and to regulate
its implementation through policies and decrees as well as institutional
arrangements. There are two important policies have been issued by the
Ministry, namely a Regulation No. P.68/Menhut-II/2008 on the regulation on the
implementation of REDD demonstration activities and SK/455/Menhut-II/2008
on the establishment of a Ministry of Forestry’s Working Group on Climate Change.
Moreover, the Ministry has issued additional policies such as: a Regulation No.
P.30/Menhut-II/2009 in regulating the implementation of REDD which includes
developers’ obligations, verification and certification, and terms of conditions;
and, a Regulation No. P.36/Menhut-II/2009 on the permissions procedures for
carbon sequestration and/or carbon storage projects in production forests and
protection forests, as well as a scheme on sharing revenue arising from such
projects among developers, communities and governments.
Other progresses have also been made domestically. In the MediumTerm Plan of the Ministry of Forestry, several priorities set up in addressing
challenges to tackle DD. Some of them are: securing forest areas by strengthening
their boundaries; undertaking degraded forest rehabilitation; protecting and
managing forest from forest fire; conserving biodiversity; revitalising the use of
forest and industries; empowering indigenous peoples and local communities;
and strengthening institutions.132
The GoI has also released provisions related to climate change in its new
law on environmental protection and management, Law No.32/2009. In Article
63, it requires national and district governments to develop GHG inventories
and take necessary policies on climate change.
In addition, Indonesia has also published a REDD+ Readiness Plan [R-Plan].
One of its features is focused on emission reduction from palm oil plantation,
strategic plans in pulp plantation, productions forests and peat lands. In general,
all progress made by Indonesia is argued as the first national legal regime in the
world for implementing REDD.133
However, the R-Plan could be criticised. Firstly, the R-Plan has no specific
strategy to reduce emissions from protected areas, and fails to address the causes
of DD outside the forestry sectors.134 Secondly, although one of the objectives of
the R-Plan is applying a ‘nationwide system of good governance level by 2008’,
no evidence shows that the objective has been met. The Plan has no strategy to
reduce illegal activities such as illegal logging or corruption. In fact, corruption
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is widespread due to the absence of effective mechanisms, lack accountability
and patronage culture. These causes of illegal activities and corruption should
be eliminated to make REDD+ in Indonesia effective.135 Neither does the Plan
discuss the importance of independent monitoring in the Monitoring, Reporting
and Verification (MRV) procedure, which is essential to provide objective
evaluation.
The progress on developing legal and policy framework does not mean
that the problems of DD have been addressed effectively. It is frequently argued
that DD in Indonesia has nothing to do with the legal and policy framework, but
has a great deal to do with the implementation of such framework. In fact, a study
conducted by Arnold shows different result by arguing that numerous laws and
policies do encourage deforestation or opens loopholes in the implementation
of forest protection. One example is the Regional Autonomy Law No.24/2004
which provides unclear delegation of power from the central government (the
Ministry of Forestry) to district governments.136 The study also concludes that
the Regional Autonomy Law fails to encourage integrated approaches within
government sectors in managing forests and is lacking the mechanisms of
public participation, particularly with respect to access to information, decisionmaking and justice.137
3. Institutional Arrangements

Institutions play a vital role in pursuing the objectives of REDD+. The
most important dilemma regarding institutions in the context of REDD+ is
that whether creating completely new institutions is necessary or whether
the existing institutions are adequate to implement REDD+. Establishing new
institutions requires a long period of time to settle with adequate management
and coordination across sectors and stakeholder groups. This attempt is
also politically challenging due to resistance from the existing government
institutions; however, maintaining the existing institutions would lead to
‘business as usual mindset and practices’.138 A ‘one size fits all’ approach does
not seem to be the solution since the best solution would depend upon national
circumstances. In the context of REDD+ in Indonesia, thus, the chosen strategy is
the creation of new institutions, namely the National Council on Climate Change
and the REDD+ Task Force.
It is argued that the National Council on Climate Change (NCCC or Dewan
Nasional Perubahan Iklim) is the most important institution in the context of
climate change at national levels. The Council was established in July 2008 by
a President Decree No.46/2008. It has main tasks as a body to co-ordinate and
monitor the implementation of climate change action plans, and to conduct
a meeting at least quarterly. There are six working groups created within the
Council, namely Adaptation Working Unit; Mitigation Working Unit; Transfer
of Technology Working Unit; Funding Working Unit; Post-Kyoto 2012 Working
Unit; and, Forestry and Land Use Conversion Working Unit in which REDD+ is
discussed. Members of the working units consist of government officers and
NGO delegates, and they meet monthly. However, as a ‘para-governmental
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organisation’, the legal status of the NCCC remains so unclear that it faces
difficulties in undertaking its mandates effectively, especially in coordinating
with government departments. In addition, it has also been argued that the
Council is in fact underfunded.139
Specifically on REDD+, a Presidential Delivery Unit for Supervision and
Monitoring Development (UKP4/REDD+ Task Force) has been established.
The REDD+ Task Force was appointed by President Yudhoyono shortly after
announcing a bilateral partnership on forest carbon between Indonesia
and Norway [Letter of Intent/LoI] in 2010. The Task Force consists of three
independent working groups focusing on institutional issues, financial issues,
and MRV issues. However, some criticise the leadership of the REDD+ Task
Force for being incompetence and lacking commitment to bring about effective
coordination with relevant government’s bodies, as the members appointed
based on political connection to President rather than based on expertise.140 The
REDD+ Task Force appears to be overlapped to the NCCC both structurally and
personally due to unclear job descriptions given by REDD+ policies, and the fact
that some members of the NCCC are also members of the REDD+ Task Force .141
In order to gain support from international community in its effort
to pursue low carbon economy as well as adaption to climate change, the
Government has created two funding institutions. The first one is the Indonesian
Climate Change Trust Fund (ICCTF) that was established by the NCCC in 2008.
The ICCTF is expected to raise fund for adaptation and mitigation programmes,
with three ‘priority windows’, namely ‘energy and energy efficiency’, ‘sustainable
forestry and peat land management’; and resilience’.142 However, until now
only few donors have contributed to the ICCTF.143   Thus, the effects of such
fund seem to be insignificant. The second institution is the Indonesian Green
Investment Fund (IGIF) managed under the Ministry of Finance, in particular
the Government Investment Unit (GIU). Its main objective is “to leverage private
and market-based funding for low emissions development programmes or
projects”. It has operated since 2010 with preliminary investment of US$100
million from the GIU itself. It is expected that within 5 years, the IGIF would have
raised investment up to US$5 billion.144
The institutions established to manage REDD+ above are faced not only
with a complicated REDD+ methodology, MRV, and safeguards, but also with
acute domestic challenges, namely poor forest governance and corruption.
These acute problems should be addressed since they are essential to determine
the successful of REDD+ in delivering effectiveness, efficient, equity and cobenefits as expected. In fact, in Indonesia, weak forest governance is argued
to be responsible for widespread illegal logging which causes about 73-88%
of total deforestation, and costs loss of revenues approximately Rp.30 trillion
(US$3billion) per year.145
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In this regard, the next question would be if a country cannot police logging,
would it be able to police not logging?146 Indeed, as a large amount of money will
be injected in REDD+ mechanisms, this may be a new avenue for corruption
among government officials and local elites if the pattern of corruption is not
addressed effectively.147
4. Partnership and The First Generation of REDD+ Project

The Indonesian Government has been involved in partnership programmes
with several countries, private sectors, financial institutions, as well as NGOs.
In 2007, Indonesia and Germany agreed to an agreement so called the Forest
and Climate Change Programme (FORCLIME) with three main components such
as: national level policy, strategy and instruments; provincial level support for
REDD demonstration activities; project level support for nature conservation
and sustainable development in the ‘Heart of Borneo’.148 The US Government
through USAID has also supported the Government with a programme called
‘Tropical Forest Conservation Action Debt for Nature’ to redirect a US$22
million Indonesian debt to be used in conservation projects in Sumatera and
Borneo.149 In 2008, the Indonesian and the Australian Governments agreed
to a US$40 million programme called the Indonesia-Australia Kalimantan
Forest Carbon Partnership (KFCP) with three main areas such as: (i) policy
development and capacity building to support participation in international
negotiations and future carbon markets; (iii) technical supports for Indonesia in
developing national forest carbon accounting and MRV systems; and (iii) further
development of demonstration activities, and the provision of related enabling
assistance to trial approaches for REDD.150
The NCCC, particularly its working group on forestry and land use
conversion, has started to work multilaterally in developing the national REDD+
architecture with the UN-REDD and the Forest Carbon Partnership Facility (FCPF)
of the World Bank.151 However, both the FCPF and UN-REDD have been criticised
by NGOs and indigenous groups because their lack of public participation.152
In addition, several concerns have been raised on the FCPF project, such
as: (1) neglecting the mandate of the World Bank in reducing poverty by focusing
its programme on forest carbon; (2) supporting carbon market that may risk the
forest governance to be taken over by commercial carbon market interests; (3)
lacking application of the Bank’s social and environmental safeguards, and in
respecting indigenous peoples’ rights.153 As a result, the FCPF is urged to conduct
an environmental and social impacts and risks assessment.154
Another important partnership for REDD+ in Indonesia is the bilateral
agreement between Indonesia and Norway. The agreement known as the Letter
of Intent (LoI) on “Cooperation on Reducing Greenhouse Gas Emissions from

Ian Fry, (2008). Op.Cit., p.175
T. Mannand T. Surya, (2009). Op.Cit., p.46
NORAD, Op.Cit., p.30
149
Ibid., p.59
150
Ibid.
151
Ibid., p. 19
152
See Ibid., p.54-55; see also T. Griffiths, (2008). Op.Cit., p.10
153
Ibid., p.38
154
K. Dooly, T. Griffiths, F. Martone, & S. Oziga, (2011). Smoke and Mirrors: A Critical Assessment of
the Forest Carbon Partnership Facility. Brussel: FERN and Forest Peoples Programme, p. 35
146
147
148

Year 2 Vol. 1, January - April 2012

INDONESIA Law Review

~ 100 ~

Deforestation and Forest Degradation” aims at conducting policy dialogue and
supporting the development of REDD+ strategy in Indonesia.155 Many argue
that the strong support of Norway in this context is related to its ambition to be
‘carbon neutral’ by 2030. While 2/3 of its reduction taking place domestically,
the rest will be met through carbon offsets abroad.156 This appears controversial
for many observers since Norway is a major exporter of fossil fuels which largely
contributes to global emissions.157 In pursuing such ambition, Norway put a
two-year moratorium on natural forest and peatland conversion in Indonesia
as one of the items in the LoI 158, and it has been implemented by a Presidential
Instruction No.10/2011 since 19 May 2011. An investigation conducted by
Telapak and the Environmental Investigation Agency (EIA), however, finds
that the moratorium has limited impacts in practice as the Instruction opens
loopholes and only covers primary forests that has already been protected under
Forestry Law as protected forest; thus, encroachment of secondary forests has
continued from the first day of moratorium.159
As far as REDD+ projects in Indonesia are concerned, the UluMasen
Project, represented the first generation of REDD, can be used as a benchmark
in designing the future REDD+ projects. According to its Project Design Note
(PDN) submitted in 2007 by the Provincial Government of Aceh in collaboration
with Carbon Conservation, an Australian carbon-trading firm, and the Fauna &
Flora International (FFI), the Project covers around 750,000 ha of forest in the
UluMasen ecosystem. It is expected to reduce 85% of deforestation in the area
similar to avoiding around 3.3 million tCO2 emitted every year.160 A US$9 million
financial support has been agreed by US Bank Marrill Lynch for 4 years with an
expectation to generate US$432 million by the next 30 years through voluntary
carbon market (Mann and Surya 2009:65).161 There are around 130,000 people
who live in 61 mukim (villages) within the project area affected by project
activities including reforestation, forest monitoring, and land-use planning and
reclassification.162
Regarding the project, some issues have been raised concerning
representation, dispute resolution, and forest protection procedure. Firstly, the
project is criticised due to unclear implementation of the principle of Free, Prior,
and Informed Consent (FPIC) and lack of participation despite the principle and
public participation being stated with a strong language in the Project Design
Note.163
In addition, in developing mechanisms for benefit distribution, the project
requires a ‘collaborative stakeholder dialogue’ to include indigenous peoples,
local communities and NGOs to participate fully and actively.164 However,
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according to a further Memorandum of Understanding [MoU] signed in July
2008, a Steering Committee will manage the distribution of the Project Account
Funds. Members of the committee consist of the Governor of Aceh himself, one
representative of Carbon Conservation, one from the FFI, one from Oxfam, and
one representative of 61 villages who is appointed directly by the communities
but nominated by the Governor.165 Hence, it is clear that the local communities
are under-represented and although one representative is appointed directly by
locals, it is likely that the Governor will nominate a person whom is closely tied
to him.166
Moreover, the project is very risky to create conflicts with local
communities or within the communities due to failure to recognise customary
land rights over the project area167 and over simplification by allowing only one
representative for 61 local communities in the Committee thus denying social
dynamic of such community as a non-homogenous group.
As far as dispute resolution is concerned, the Singaporean International
Arbitration Centre (SIAC) is referenced by the MoU as the only forum to seek
justice with English as the official working language. Parties involved in dispute
resolution have to be responsible for any cost during the proceeding. Although
the MoU seems to provide access to justice to all stakeholders of the UluMasen
project, the access available is financially and technically challenging for the
local communities.168
Furthermore, although the Project Design Note says nothing about
the strategy used to undertake forest protection procedure, news reportedly
confirms that “the forest [area of the project] will be guarded by 1000 heavilyarmed former Free Aceh rebels” as stated by the Carbon Conservation Chief
Executive (ABC 2008).169 Historically, after a long standing armed conflict in
Aceh, the peace agreement between the GoI and the Free Aceh Movement have
finally signed in 2005. In fact, using ex-combatants of the Free Aceh Movement
for guarding the UluMasen project area may lead to re-militarisation which risks
the peace agreement in Aceh. Indeed, as a private military, no regulation would
be able to regulate the ex-combatants in their action committing wrongdoing or
violating human rights. This legal loophole may bring traumatic experience and
insecurity for Acehnese.
B. Safeguards and Co-Benefits

Although the main focus of the REDD+ mechanism is ‘reducing emissions’,
the implications of the mechanism are connected to the issues of rights, land
tenure, biodiversity etc. The international community is aware that REDD+
should be safeguarded and promote co-benefits. This is clearly stated in the
Decision 2/CP.13, which stipulates that REDD (then REDD+) can “promote
co-benefits and may complement the aims and objectives of other relevant
international conventions and agreement” and “the need of local and indigenous
communities should be addressed when action is taken to reduce emissions
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from deforestation and forest degradation in developing countries”.170 Thus, it is
worth discussing the extent to which the safeguards and co-benefits, especially
the rights of indigenous people, biodiversity and ecosystem services, are
implemented by REDD+ in Indonesia.
1. The Rights of Indigenous Peoples

In Indonesia, around 35-95 million people are considered indigenous
people since they maintain their traditional way of life and distinct cultures.
171
Despite the fact that they are recognised by the 1945 Indonesian Constitution
172
, there is no special, comprehensive, and more importantly, enforceable regime
to protect their status and rights. A study conducted by Safitri and Bosko in
2002 is helpful to diagnose general types of laws and regulations on indigenous
groups so called ‘adatcommunities’ in Indonesia. They conclude that laws and
regulations on indigenous peoples in Indonesia are vague, partly regulated,
normative in nature or not self-executing norms, and more importantly, intended
to integrate indigenous peoples to the dominant society.173 In fact, the concept of
integrating indigenous groups to the dominant society (assimilation) has been
omitted by the International Labour Organisation (ILO)’s Conventions both No.
169 and No. 107, two most popular conventions in the context of indigenous
peoples. Rather, they even go further to recognise the right to self-determination,
which is further adopted by the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of
Indigenous Peoples (UNDRIP)174.
Considering the lack of recognition of their status and rights, adat
communities in Indonesia are very vulnerable to be marginalised in the
implementation of REDD+. For decades they have faced injustices: being displaced
and their ancestral areas being taken for commercial interests, such logging or
palm oil plantation, and even for transmigration.175 Thus, it is plausible that adat
communities are very sceptical to development agendas including the REDD+
projects since they have historical experience from many types of development
schemes imposed by the government to their livelihood but they usually receive
no benefit from the schemes.
Many indigenous groups and NGOs have pushed the inclusion of the
principle of Free Prior and Informed Consent (FPIC) in designing the REDD+
architecture. In fact, little evidence has shown such principle has been
implemented by the Government or developers of the REDD+ projects.176
Indeed, the principle that embraces that no development, administrative or
other intervention should take place in an indigenous area “without the free,
prior and informed consent of the indigenous peoples concerned”177 is essential
Decision 2/CP.13, p.8, FCCC/CP/2007/6.Add.1, preambles
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for preventing the marginalisation of such peoples. Even for the Forest Carbon
Partnership Facility (FCPF) Projects, the World Bank as the proponent of the
initiative is more likely to use ‘free prior informed consultation’, as stated in its
Operational Procedures, instead of implementing the principle of Free Prior
Informed Consent (FPIC).178 Indeed, ‘consultation’ does not equal to ‘consent’
as being consulted prior the project implemented does not mean indigenous
groups agree with it.179
Several attempts have been taken by indigenous groups and NGOs
concerning the negative impacts of REDD+ on indigenous peoples for example by
using complain procedures available at international fora, as well as by sending
protest letters directly to the project developers. In July 2009, nine Indonesian
organisations with their international network submitted communication to
the Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination (CERD) following
two previous communications submitted in February 2009 and July 2007.
The communication is complaining the failure of the Government to comply
with the CERD’s recommendations to review its laws and regulations that
discriminate indigenous peoples including REDD+ policies in Indonesia.180 In
February 2011, Yayasan Petak Danum (2011), a grassroots organisation based
in Central Kalimantan, sent a protest letter to the Australian Delegates whom
were visiting the Australia-Indonesia Kalimantan Forest Carbon Partnership.
(KFCP) site. Several issues on the KFCP project was raised, which are, among
others, lacking recognition and respect for customary rights and local values,
and lacking the inclusion of community inputs during the project activities.181
Despite such attempts above, indigenous peoples’ status and rights are
persistently being excluded from REDD+ policies. The Ministry of Forestry
Regulation No.P.30/Menhut-II/2009 on “Reducing Emissions from Deforestation
and Forest Degradation (REDD) Procedure”, for instance, defines ‘indigenous
forest’ as “state forest located in the area of customary law”.182 ‘State forest’ is,
in fact, defined as “a forest on lands which bear no ownership rights”.183 These
definitions are brought directly from Law No.41/1999 on Forestry which has
proven being unable to respect and protect the rights of indigenous peoples
and even creating land conflicts between indigenous peoples with governments
as well as corporations. Although Law 41/1999 on Forestry states that the
“Government shall stipulate the status of forest and indigenous forest shall
be stipulated if any and its existence acknowledge”184 until now there is no
regulation ensuring indigenous forests.

See Paragraph 1 of the World Bank’s Operational Procedures (OP) 4.10 on Indigenous Peoples
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Another policy that has the potentials to discriminate indigenous peoples
is the Ministry of Forestry Decree No.SK 159/Menhut-II/2004 on ‘Ecosystem
Restoration in Production Forests (ERC). The Decree establishes “conservation
related area through a 100 year licence for the rehabilitation management of
old logging concessions”. This scheme works by prohibiting cutting trees and
restricting the use of forest for non-timber products only. However, around 20
million hectares of forests under such scheme are within indigenous territory and
the scheme potentially marginalises indigenous peoples and local communities
from utilising the area.185
It seems unlikely that indigenous peoples would benefit from REDD+
considering the fact that their status and rights have been excluded by regulations
in the first place. They are not considered to have rights on their territory, because
according to the Indonesian legal system their territory is located within a state
forest and the state forest cannot be titled a land right. This condition has caused
severe conflicts in forestry sectors. Indeed, according to WALHI, 36% of such
conflicts are related to land rights or land tenure.186 Thus, if there is no change
in the treatment to indigenous peoples taken by the Ministry of Forestry, it is
likely that similar pattern in the exclusion of indigenous peoples would continue
to happen under REDD+ and even may worsen the existing conflicts. Hence, in
terms of equity, as one of the tools to assess REDD+, it is still a long way to go for
the Indonesia’s REDD+ projects to prove that they are capable of bringing about
equity and benefit to adat communities.
2. Biodiversity and Ecosystem Services

Alarming rates in the loss of biodiversity has created two competing
arguments on the relationship between REDD+ and biodiversity. Some argue
that REDD+ would bring positive impacts on conservation of biodiversity since
it would prevent DD in Indonesia’s natural forests as the home of biological
diversity187 (‘co-benefit’ of REDD+). On the other hand, others argue that unclear
technical matters for example definition of ‘forest’ or the scope of REDD+ which
includes sustainable forest management (SFM) would provide legal loopholes in
its implementation. As a result, instead of intensifying activities that can avoid
deforestation and forest degradation, REDD+ would provide ‘extra income’ for
plantation companies to continue their expansion of monoculture plantation
within natural forests.
In fact, the term ‘co-benefits’ is also contentious. The term implies that
“benefits and synergies may arise through REDD, but their generation is only
considered as a sub-ordinate goal”.188 As REDD+ is merely focusing on forest
carbon, it prioritises areas of forests that store as much carbon as possible to
generate more payment, and is potential to overlook other important values of
forests and their ecosystem services. In some cases, a forest area may have an
essential role for preserving biodiversity and providing ecosystem services but
it may be less valuable from the carbon perspective as the area may store a little
amount of carbon. In this case, therefore, under the REDD+ schemes the area like
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savannahs or non-forested wetland may be threatened by the needs to convert
such an area into forest carbon projects in order to store more carbon in the
area.189 Indeed, REDD+ is potential to be ‘a double-edged sword’ for biodiversity
depending on how the architecture of REDD+ is designed.190
Indonesia with approximately 94 million ha of forest is considered as a
country with mega-biodiversity. It contains 10% of plants, 12% of mammal species,
16% of birds, and 16 of world’s reptiles and amphibians.191 However, based on
the IUCN red list of threatened species, there are 174 mammal species, 90 birds,
30 amphibians, 3 reptiles, 21 plant species being listed as critically endangered,
endangered, or vulnerable.192 One important area in Indonesia that provides
ecosystem services for local communities and maintains biodiversity as well as
contains a large amount of biomass is peat area. Despite the fact that a Presidential
Decree No.32/1990 prohibits the development of peat areas deeper than 3 metres,
development to convert such areas into plantation is still continued.193
Even, a REDD+ demonstration project under the Australia-Indonesia KCPF
to rehabilitate a peat swamps area in Central Kalimantan is criticised by a group
of peat scientists and practitioners because the project uses excavators and other
heavy equipments to restore the areas. It is argued that the activity runs counter
with REDD+ effectiveness in reducing emissions, since a large amount of GHG
may be emitted during the rehabilitation activities and such activities are also
harmful to the ecosystem, biodiversity and ecosystem services they provide.194
Since the locations of REDD+ may be different in ecological characteristic
and environmental impacts, there is a need to undertake a strategic environmental
assessment and environmental impact assessment before implementing REDD+.
In Indonesia, the strategic environmental and environmental assessment
(SEA and EIA) is required by Law No.32/2009 on Environmental Protection
and Management 195. However, it is unclear how many REDD+ projects have
undertaken a SEA and EIA prior their activities although there is no requirement
to do so in REDD+ policies. Therefore, it seems that the absence of requirement
to undertake a SEA and EIA prior REDD+ activities in the REDD+ policies shows
an attempt taken by the Government to trespass the environmental regulations
in order to design REDD+ architectures as soon as possible. In fact, SEA and IEA
is needed to assess the potential risks of a REDD+ project so that a most suitable
scenario should be designed minimise the risks.
IV. Conclusion

Forest plays a two-fold roles in the context of climate change. On the
one hand, it is a carbon storage which absorbs GHG in the air, and stores them
in its trees. On the other hand, forest is also a major source of emissions due
to deforestation and forest degradation (DD) which contributes more than
emissions from transportation and industries combined. Therefore, it seems
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plausible that emissions from DD occurred mostly in developing countries have
to be addressed by the international climate change regime in a post-2012
commitment.
A new scheme to reduce emissions in this context so called “Reducing
Emissions from Deforestation and Forest Degradation plus Conservation,
Sustainable Management of Forests, and Enhancement of Forest Carbon Stocks”
(REDD+) has been discussed under the UNFCCC process, and it clearly will be
“one of the key pillars of the post-2012 international climate regime”. Despite
many optimistic views on such scheme, much hard work needs to be done. Several
issues remain unclear especially with regard to methodology, finance, leakage,
and safeguards particularly indigenous peoples’ rights and biodiversity.
However, since REDD+ is easily to be a ‘side-edged sword’ designing the
regime in rush would create new problems or even worsen the existing problems.
This tendency can be seen from a rush development of REDD+ architecture in
Indonesia where DD is a very complex phenomenon involved socio-economic,
environmental, as well as rights issues. If the causes of emissions from DD
in Indonesia is not merely about economic development but is also related
to forest governance and culture of corruption, it appears that injecting a
large amount of money would not be the best solution. In fact, this injection
would provide opportunities to maintain the culture of corruption within the
government officials and local elites. Moreover, recognizing the status and rights
of indigenous peoples is also an essential part in addressing forestry problems.
This is because such people have proven themselves to be able to conserve the
forests and to use it in sustainable manner for centuries.
Therefore, while the basic idea of REDD+ seems very noble and simple
but in its details it is very complex. In fact, REDD+ objectives themselves appear
to be contested. Carbon effectiveness, for instance, is possible to undermine
co-benefits of REDD+ on biodiversity. As the need to reduce and absorb as
many GHGs as possible increases, a concern on development of an effective
GMO tree in this regard is alarming for biodiversity. Moreover, cost efficiency
is possible to undermine the equity outcomes especially in the benefit sharing
and participation, which requires equal sharing of benefit and high-cost in
negotiating and obtaining agreement from all REDD+ stakeholders. Thus, a
thorough assessment on the impacts REDD+ is needed so that it could balance
all different interests in shaping an effective, efficient, equitable and co-benefit
REDD+ scheme.
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